Wittgenstein on the Other Minds Problem
This is a regular seminar in which graduate researchers (MA and PhD) will present their work. This week Jasmin Tr盲chtler (PhD) presents her work. All are welcome.
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Abstract:
In Philosophy of Mind, the topic of 鈥淥ther Minds鈥� is connected with precarious problems, insofar as it seems not only uncertain how we know what another person is thinking and feeling, but also how we know that she is thinking and feeling 鈥� that is, she is an animated being and not simply an automaton. Wittgenstein does not aim at developing a "theory of mind" to address these problems. His approach is one of 聽describing the use of psychological concepts in our everyday language-games (e.g. 鈥渢hinking鈥�, 鈥渇eeling鈥�, 鈥渉oping鈥�, etc.) in order to elucidate and disentangle the confused and metaphysical misinterpretations of the so-called "problem 聽of other minds" offered by philosophers. In the course of these grammatical investigations, Wittgenstein approaches the Other Minds Problem as an issue about the evidence for our statements regarding the other鈥檚 sensing and experiencing. He describes this evidence as 鈥渋mponderable鈥� and characterises our statement鈥檚 ground as wavering from almost mathematical certainty in some cases to deep doubts in others. The task of my theses can be framed thus: What is the nature of our psychological statements about the other, if 鈥渢he most important part is imponderable?鈥�